ABSTRACT -The doctrine of informed consent is evolving. It has taken different routes in different jurisdictions. However, these different paths are converging to a general consensus. The Bolam test, which has been the primary exposition of this doctrine in this country, sets the standard of care as a matter of medical judgement. However, recent cases, particularly Rogers v Whitaker, shift the perspective in favour of warning the patient of material risks inherent to proposed treatment. Whether this information is sufficient to give consent is not a question the answer to which depends upon standards of medical practice. There is no doubt that this is the evolving global trend. Whilst this might seem more onerous the doctrine is of constructive use in securing public awareness in organ donation and in the effectiveness of public health policies.
The history
It is a mistake to view a continuum as a single event. The evolving phenomenon that is known as informed consent is a montage of perception and the changing balance of power between patient and doctor. This entered the English law via the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 1 which held that the 'duty to warn' arises from the 'patient's right to know of material risks, a right which in turn arises from the patient's right to decide for himself or herself whether or not to submit to the medical treatment proposed'. This is echoed in the expressions used in American authorities such as 'the patient's right of self-determination' , as used in the case of Canterbury v. Spence [1972] . 2 The English law took the same view but differently and later. 
The current perspective
Whilst no single word or sentence can encapsulate the wisdom of practice of a profession, some can, by their aura of immunity, escape or at least not discharge that which they should prevent. It thus has remained for the landmark judgement of Rogers v. Whitaker [1992] 5 to express what has been a source of major controversy. The facts are simple but tragic. Marie Whitaker who had been almost totally blind in her right eye, contacted Christopher Rogers; an ophthalmic surgeon, who advised her that an operation on that eye would not only improve its appearance but would probably restore significant sight to it. She agreed to undergo surgery. After the operation there was no improvement to the right eye, and Whitaker developed inflammation in the left eye which led to loss of all sight in that eye. She sued Rogers in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for damages in negligence. Campbell J found Rogers liable in that he had failed to warn Whitaker that, as a result of the surgery, she might develop a condition known as sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye.
In the case it was said that nothing is to be gained by reiterating the oft used and somewhat amorphous phrase 'informed consent' . The judgement is explicit. Simplicity has no need of sophistry to distract. The words express without embellishment the public fear of complete autonomy. One must expect a change although this is a change that has already happened. Looking forward to the past of Canterbury v. Spence [1972] 
The German experience
There is considerable difference between the laws governing involuntary admission to hospital and treatment under Mental Health Law in the United Kingdom and Germany. Whereas British law gives key powers to multi-professional decision making and relatives, German law requests formal Court decisions even in routine issues. This reflects a different understanding of individual rights and their protection. The German mental health law is motivated by the experiences of the totalitarian National Socialist regime. It tries to protect the patients' rights by restricting physicians, hospitals and family members' influence. British law, on the other hand, assumes that experts as well as family members act benevolently in the patient's interest and prefers less formal mechanisms and expresses trust in professional ethics. 8 In the Federal Republic of Germany there is no regulation which can be invoked to supervise a patient against his will after discharge from hospital. This is the freedom to be ill which is estimated within the 'Freiheit Zum Krankstein' (BVerfGE 58,208 226ff; 1998 erneut in 2 BuR 2270 (96)). Again the convergence of European medicolegal jurisprudence will need to reconcile these different approaches. This reconciliation will take more than time.
The applications
It is a mistake to view consent as a burden or hurdle that has to be vaulted rather than a standard of communicatory excellence to which we ought to aspire. The doctrine of presumed consent is an attempt to increase the number of organ donors. A presumption is a rule of law which provides that if a party proves a certain fact, known as the primary fact, then another fact, the presumed fact, will also be taken to be proved, unless evidence is adduced by the opponent to 'rebut' the presumption or, in other words contradict the presumed fact. Several examples have entered everyday usage. A person who has not been heard of for seven years by those who, if he had been alive would be likely to have heard of him, is presumed to be dead.
A presumption is the mechanism by which society encapsulates its wisdom. This is so with the presumption of innocence. The burden of proof is always cast upon the party asserting criminality.
The Organ Donation (Presumed Consent and Safeguards) Bill 9 was introduced by Labour backbencher, Tom Watson, under the ten-minute rule. The bill would introduce an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, system of organ donation after death, so everyone would be a potential donor unless they registered otherwise. This was an attempt to help the 7,000 people in the United Kingdom who are awaiting transplants. It is worthwhile, reinforcing the excellent first organ donation campaign aimed at African-Caribbeans. This is truly praiseworthy since the adverts give sufficient information to inform the reader of the scope of the problem and its solution, yet are sufficiently brief to be assimilated by a reader quickly passing. This is the dilemma in public health and ethics. Too little might alienate and patronise, too much might overwhelm.
The future
As medicolegal issues converge, particularly in Europe, the different approaches of different jurisdictions need to be analysed to aid convergence. This convergence is already part of the analysis of our educated public assessing its needs and the mechanism of supply of these needs. As the doctrine of informed consent evolves, as it will, so increasingly it will become synonymous with the sharing of information. This is not defensive medicine. Medicine without consent or this sharing of information is offensive medicine. Medicine with shared information is effective medicine.
